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icy: Local Need versus
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'I

states have been thrust into a more pivotal role under the evolving
Federalism." Reagan administration officials are pressuring the
to develop the capacity and willingness to be effective partners in
of new federalism, where the federal role is reduced and state
local governments are the managers of their own problems. Specifithe reduction in federal aid for local governments demands that
recognize the new, critical role of state assistance for urban areas
communities, alike. Most local governments that experience a
in federal aid in the 1980s will seek an increase in state aid, but
be crucial for the neediest communities, those with socioeconomic
' fiscal problems that will be most adversely affected by federal aid
The compelling demand that states now face is to structure state
to be responsive to community needs.
provide both financial and programmatic assistance to local
!rrunellts. The vast amount of state financial assistance is categorical
with the largest allocations going to local governments for
and public welfare. But since 1960, noncategorical aid-state
Snimrl~--n2IS accounted for 8 to 10 percent of total intergoverneXJ)eI1ldit:url~s in the 50 states. Since state revenue sharing is
to local governments for locally detennined purposes, it presof the best mechanisms for aiding communities most severely
by the loss of federal dollars.
SHARING IN THE STATES

extensive is revenue sharing in the states and how do states
these funds? The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental

I)
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Relations (ACIR, 1980) reports that 49 states have established revenue
sharing programs with their local governments, and that the~e ~nds. are
distributed to local governments following four popular ~ntena. First, .
returning money to the location of origin of the reve~ue IS used when :
.
the state collects sales or income taxes that are locally Imposed and
returns these to the locality. Second, reimbursing local g?vernments
property tax exemptions authorized by state statutes IS u~ed to
tribute as much as 40 percent of state-local revenue sha~g
1980:5). Third, in 1977, 30 states allocated all or part of their
sharing money to local governments on a per capita basis
7), which, while politically popular, does no! consider the difjren~nti.al
needs of communities and their residents. Finally, states have
implementing revenue sharing programs that factor-in the needs
local government. Twenty-three states have needs-based systems
hen, 1982:19), with need defined in terms of either local government
.
capacity, tax effort, or social and economic need.
Revenue sharing has been the third largest category of state aid
the 1970s, following only aid for education and welfa~e . In 1982
spent over $10 billion on local government revenue shanng, o~ 10
of total state aid. With most education and welfare funds gOing to
units of local government, revenue sharing is, in many states, the
important form of state aid for cities. It ha.s grown faster than any
category of state intergovernmental spendmg over the past tw~
with a 1962-1982 growth rate 6f 1,100 percent. 1 Just how effective
states in targeting funds to those communities most. in need?
search reported here analyzes state-city. revenue ~hanng over a
period to determine the importance of aty .needs In the ~evenue
receipts of large U.S. cities. In addition to aty need, a senes ~f
factors are analyzed to assess their impact on revenue shanng.
THE RESPONSIVENESS OF STATE AID TO CITIES
.
The number of studies examining the responsiveness of state
cities has increased in recent years. Much of the research has
either the total state financial aid program for cities or nT"~In'a1Tlll
forms of assistance with most finding state aid to be re~ipons:ive
aspect of community need. For exam~le, Dye an~.
that states were responding to needs m central aties of
politan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) and apparently did th~.better
federal government. Teitelbaum and Simon (1979), wnting for
tional Governors' Association, found states to be good tarl1:et:ers
particularly when applying federal pass-through funds to
critique of Dye and Hurley'S research, Ward (1981) argued that
of per capita measures of state aid along ~ith percentage
need may be misleading if such measures distort the actual
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betwee.n need a~d state or federal outlays. Ward's reanalysis using total
state aid (unadjusted for population) and the actual size of the city
population in need (e.g., total elderly, not proportion elderly) demonstrated much stronger relationships between total aid and actual size of
the need.
.
. Subsequent rese.arch into state-city aid programs has considered this
Issue when analyzmg the targeting of state funds. For instance, Morgan
and England (1984) used total measures of state aid to examine fiscal and
programmatic assis~nce to cities. Analyzing state programs for cities
over 50,000 population, they found city distress to be an important
determinant of aid allocations from 1962 to 1977. Residual state aid to
cities w~s exa~ned by Pelisse~o (1984). By regressing state aid on city
~opulation, t~s rese~ch e.xamn:ed only the non population-based portion. of .sta~e aid receipts m major U.S. cities. The results supported
earlter findmgs that state aid was responsive to city needs and further
demonstrated that states became better targeters over time.
Rese~r~ ~n the rel~tive responsiveness of state revenue sharing proIS hmlted. One Important study that has examined the effectiveof state formula and project grants to cities (Stein, 1981) found
grants to be better targeted to social and fiscal need. One of the
~".f'U'"<U'U'''> of these findings is that states with project-based revenue
programs can target such funds to needier commnnities better
with formula mechanisms, such as population-based programs.
also noted that the conclusions in some of the above studies must
'-<1L'UU'U"'lY interpreted, since each state has its own set of rules for
He has shown that the observed responsiveness may
very effective targeting of just a few states.
the concerns raised above, it seems appropriate to consider, in
to need, several state system factors that may affect th.e disof state-city revenue sharing. Since state revenue sharing dissystems are somewhat varied (ACIR, 1980), certain states will
be ~etter targeters to ~ocal need than others. One of the assumpof this research, then, IS that states using a needs-based distribusystem will be ·better targeters than states employing reimburse. population, or formula-based systems.
broa~l~, state resources in general may be hypothesized to afpoliaes for urban areas. Policy scholars have shown that a
eco~omic r~sources are linked to policy outputs (see Dye, 1976);
state mcome IS related to urban policies (LeMay, 1973); that state
and industrialization are positive determinants of state finanprogrammatic aid to cities (Morgan and England, 1984); and that
revenue efforts are often tied to the state's disposition toward
local governments (Stonecash, 1981). Presumably, then, greater
resources should be positively related to state-city revenue sharing.

\.;
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A third consideration revolves around the legal "service provision"
relationships between states and cities. States that have become more
central providers of local services (Stephens and Olson, 1979) are also
found to give less aid to local governments (Morgan and England, 1984).
In addition, states have been shown to give larger aid amounts to cities
with heavier financial burdens, those who fund education and
services from the municipal budget (Morgan and England, 1984).
ther research into state categorical aid to cities for welfare and eauc,an'Dn
supports the proposition that state aid for these two functions is
geted to cities with more educational or welfare responsibilities
.
issero, 1985). However, the direct link to revenue sharing is less likely
be significant. In fact, we may assume at this point t~at cities ~th
functional responsibilities for education or welfare Will not recelve
.
amounts of revenue sharing, since the state may have already
sated them for these services through categorical aid programs.
might even argue that such cities will receive less revenue sharing
ey, since they receive more than average aid in the education and
fare areas, making their total state aid larger than cities without
functional responsibilities.
This chapter.attempts to extend the state aid responsiveness
by focusing on state revenue sharing programs. Given that
stated criterion in at least 23 state revenue sharing programs,
appropriate to analyze how well targeted are revenue shari~g
large cities. The importance of state resources, revenue sharmg
tion systems, and municipal government service obligations will
examined to see if local need or state system factors are fhe more
tant determinants of state-city revenue sharing policy.
DATA AND METHODS
This chapter attempts to answer the general research
state-city revenue sharing targeted to the neediest cities? .
questions include: Have states become better targeters of
ing funds over time? Have particular dimensions of city
influential in state revenue sharing allocations than others?
level factors more important determinants of state revenue
cities? To answer these questions, data have been collected .
largest cities in the states. This sample includes all cities that
populations of 300,000 or more (but not cities that achieved ··
population later than 1970.)2 These large cities were chosen ·
pIe because the most serious problems that came to be
the urban crisis were and still are found among this
reason, one would expect state governments to be
acquainted with the problems and distress in these
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awarene~s could provide the opportunity for targeting state-city revenue sharmg to these city governments.
Th~ analysis of ~tat~-city revenue sharing covers three time periods.
~.~ fi~t 7ar studied IS 1962,a period before the awakening to an urban
cn~lS m t IS country, and one which also witnessed little in terms of an
active r~le ~or states in. urban affairs. Consequently, one would not
expect slg~fica~t targeting of state-city revenue sharing to have occurred .durmg this time. The secon~ time point is 1976, or 15 years later.
~ollowmg the peak of the urban cnsis and the predominant federal role
m urban pr.oblem-solving, this period was chosen to reflect the evolving
state capaClty and willl'ngnes s t 0 al'd urban areas. Here one expects to
see somewhat b~tter targeting of state revenue sharing to needier cities
because state legIslatures have been reapportioned; adding more urban
. many states have established state-level departments of ur.a.ffarrs, ~d both the federal-local grant developments and the crisis
cI~es ~urmg the previ~us decade forced states to take a more active
m Clty problem-solvmg. The final time period is 1982 and w
to assess targeting. practices at the start of a more state-center~
!der.,llism era. The expectation is that state responsiveness to city needs
be most ~ronounced 20 years after the first period analyzed. Also, of
here IS the de~ree ?f tarl?e~g taking place two years after Presibegan signaling his mtent to increase state responsibility
problems.
. dependent variable is state revenue sharing receipts of sample
~ each of the three years, derived from Census Bureau reports 3
mclude data by city on intergovernmental revenue received fro~
gove~nm:nts ~or "general support." Among the sample cities, revsharmg lS a slZable component of total state aid for local governT~~ average revenue sharing fund in the states in which the 47
Clties a:e located and ~e prop~rtion of total state intergovernexpendltures for three times pomts are indicated below:

1

$ 26 million
$181 million
$305 million

(7.7% of total state aid)
(10.1 % of total state aid)
(10% of total state aid)

is size of st~te reve~ue sharing important, but so is its growth
While state mtergovernmental spending increased 800
from 1962 to 1982, revenue sharing grew by over 1,072 percentgrowth rate than any functional category of state aid.
of state revenue sharing is often allocated on the basis of
't"ua'''Ulil. a ,Pattern typi~al of much intergovernmental aid (see
and M~ler, 1984; Pehssero, 1984), total revenue sharing reeach City was regressed on population to produce a nonvU''''.....:Ll••

!!

. ,.
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population-determined measure of revenue sharing. Removing pop~a
tion from the dependent variable should not be interpreted as rem?vmg
the primary or sole basis for distributing the funds, however. Fift~en
states among those in which tl:te sample cities are !~cated use popul.atio.n
as a factor in allocating state revenue sharing to CIties. But populatio~ lS
the dominant factor in the allocation process of only seven cases. lhe
rest of the cities receive revenue sharing with population as only one
among as many as six factors weighed in the cru:tribution process. The .
new nonpopulation based residual re,:enue shanng m~as?re~ for 1962,: .
1976 and 1982 allow for analysis of thiS form of state aid m light of
diff~ential needs of the sample cities. In other words, with PCIP.l:u.'amJn~
based factors removed from the measure, one can begin to exarrune
much state revenue sharing was allocated on a needs basis and
much according to state-level influences.
.
Since the focus of this study is upon city need, the mdependent
abIes used here represent one of three dimensions of need or .
communities. There is difficulty in defining exactly what constitutes
need-a problem noted by the AOR (1980) in its. own work o~
revenue sharing with local governments. Need will be treated 10
study similar to its use in previous analyses of intergo,:ernmental
responsiveness (Cuciti, 1978; Dye and Hurley, 1978; Stem, 1981).
is, three dimensions of city need are included among the
variables: sOcial need, economic need, and fiscal need .. The three
tors of social need, taken from the 1960, 1970, and 1980 cenSl,lses,
clude: (1) elderly (total population 65 years or older), (2) poverty
families below the poverty threshold), and (3) crime rate (total
crimes reported). Since each measure is also highlr correlated (r > "
with population, each was regressed on p~pulation t? prodl,lce .
sidual measure of social need. Two econorruc need vanables .
derived from the above three censuses. City population growth
measure of population change in the cities f~r 1950-.60,.
1970-80. Home ownership, the other economic need mdicator,
sured by total owner-occupied housing during each period. 4
two measures of the financial health of city governments have
included. The first of these is city budget deficit or the UUJ"::«"''''
tween city revenues and spending in 1%2, 1976, and 1982. The
measure is fiscal effort in the same three years, measured as
between general revenue and total personal income in th~. city
If state revenue sharing money is targeted to needy cI~es,
sidual revenue sharing will be positively related to the SO~lal
fiscal need measures and inversely related to the economic
sures. The expectation is that targeting did not ?ccur in 1962,
fore the relationships should be weak or opposite 9f the
tion. On the other hand, residual revenue sharing in 1976
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~pected.to show stronger evidence of targeting, which would be conslStent With research on aggregate state aid to cities (Dye and Hurley
1978; Morgan and England, 1984; Pelissero, 1984).
'
Because w,e are confronted with 50 separate and distinct state aid
syste~s (Stem, 1981), a series of indicators will be employed in the
analyslS that measure state differences. First, a dummy variable has
been cr~ated fo~ ea~h o~ the three years that indicates whether or not the
p~edommant cnterlon m a state's allocation system is municipal need.
~mce states use as many as six criteria in the revenue sharing distribution system, state~ that use local need as the major factor have been
code~ 1, all others are coded 0. 6 This variable will serve as a state-level
p~e~cto~ that is most directly related to each state's revenue sharing
distribution system. The assumption here is that state use of a needsbased alloca~on system will be positively linked with more residual
reven:ue shanng. To assess state resources, measures of both state tax
capaCIty and ta~ effort will be included in the analysis. 7 We can assume
th.a t states m~g greater .tax efforts and states with greater tax capacity
will als? prOVide more reSIdual revenue sharing funds to cities. Finally,
th.e asslgnme~t of m.a~or state service responsibilities at the local level
will be exa~ed. CItIes have been coded according to whether they
edu~ation or w,elfare ser~ices ~ough municipal financing, both
sefVlces, or nelt~er servIce. This measure is labeled "functional
(Liebert, 1974). Because functional comprehenhas been linked in the ~terat~ to both total state aid (Morgan
England: 19~) and categonca~ aId ~or education and welfare (Pel1985) ~ CI~es: ~e expect this varIable to be negatively related to
shanng m CIties.
YSIS OF RESIDUAL REVENUE SHARING, 1962-1982

NlIllnPle. regression models were developed for residual revenue shar. City need for each time-point. The initial models included all
mdepende.nt variables measuring need and are displayed in table
. The regre~slOn for 1962 showed no significant effects for any of the
need vanables. Th~ ~~tiple correlation (R) of .44 suggests that
19 percent ~f the varIability In 1962 residual revenue sharing can be
. . for Wl.t h ~ese need predictors. And although the model is
statistic~lly Significant, the analysis is consistent with the expecta. that reSidual revenue sharing would not be well targeted in this first
of the 1976 regression in table 12.1 suggest that some

c~anges may have occurred since 1962. Three of the seven
dlsp~y stronger and significant standardized regression co(Beta)

In

1976 than in 1%2. This suggests that state revenue

mnz-::-
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Table 12.1 Multiple Regression Models for Residual State-City Revenue
Sharing and City Need, 1962-1982

P'r edictorl
Elder l y lluidual

1962

1976

1982

Coefficient

I.ta
t-ratio

.179
. 179
.946

. 221
.235
3.021"

1. 792

.016
.017
.195

- . 043
-.043
- . 286
.178
. 178
1 . 388

povel'ty Residual

b
•• ta

t-n.do

. 175
.175
. 991

Crime R.esidua l

b
Bata
t-ratiO

- . 022
-.022
- . 135

- .085
-.085
-1.040

b
leta

- . 022
-.118
- . 513

. 004
.036
. 485

Growth Rate

t-ratio
HOtM Ownersh i p

Budget Deficit.

riaea l Effot:t

t-r a tio

-.000
- . 693
-.276

-.OOC
-.992
-10.094"

leta
t-J'atio

-.000
-.284
-1.642

. 000
1.109
10 . 330·

b
J.ta

b

Bet.
t-t:atio

(Intet:ee'P d

4,656
. 252
1.153

- . 733
-.060
- .778

- . 273

. 930

,

1.13

. 93
.87
3S . 88"

(N)

(42)

(47)

. 44
!2

.'P

~

. 19

.354
. 354 '

. 05 .

haring was more targeted to need in this year than it had been '.'
.
.
t cities with more
with more revenue shanng gomg o.
. . , this
homeowners and larger deficits. What 1S surpnsmg m .
"
among the n~ed variables that were not significant p~dictorsd
. hi between revenue sharing and fiscal effort, cnme, an
: : : e lfurther away from a pattern of targetin~ fOv:;aU,
..
variable model produced an R= .93 and ~ccounte or
'.
variability in 1976 residual revenue sharmg.
. .
. I
d l' t ble 12 1 is the seven-variable regreSSIon
Thefinamo ema
.
dl
In general, the 1982 analysis shows this to be a p~o:.er mo e
revenue sharing than that for 1976. ~lthoug .1ve
.
stronger determinants in 1982, several dIsplayed Slgn
,

S
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three social need measures had higher Betas in i982 than in either 1962
or 1976, but none was significant. And while the pattern of targeting to
cities with more elderly and higher crime rates improved, there was a
slight drop in the already weak targeting on poverty. Homeownership
was the only significant predictor in this year, "and its standardized
regression coefficient was smaller (-.37) than in 1976 also. The most
divergent changes occurred among the fiscal need predictors where revenue sharing seemed to improve its targeting to cities making stronger
fiscal efforts while also being less responsive to deficits. Although neither variable is significant, this pattern is very similar to the finding for
1962. Overall, this seven-variable model accounts for 49 percent of the
variability in residual revenue sharing-a significant drop from 1976. At
the same time, the significant predictors in both 1976 and 1982 were
those showing better targeting to need.
'
The next step in the analysis was to assess the importance of the four
state-level measures. A first examination of the intercorrelations among
these state-level variables demonstrated that aU four could not be included in a multivariate model. Specifically, this was due to the high
correlation between state tax effort and revenue sharing distribution
system variables. In each year there was a strong positive relationship
between the two measures, showing that states making strong tax
efforts also tend to be states that distribute revenue sharing funds on a
local government needs-basis. 8 Such a relationship is significant in itself
, and suggests that states with better tax efforts are also more likely to
, consider local government needs. The tax effort variable will be dropped
in the succeeding analysis, though, to permit us to employ the revenue
sharing distribution measure in the multivariate model.
Similar to the analysis performed with the predictors of city need, the
0;,.'''...,..... 1> three state system variables were employed in a multivariate
Table 12.2 displays one multiple regression analysis for each of
time points. It is clear that in i962 none of these predictors was
significant determinant of residual revenue sharing in the sample cit- ,
The 1976 model is significant and warrants some discussion. The
statistically significant predictor was the revenue sharing distribusystem measure (Beta = .29). This positive relationship indicates that
residual revenue sharing was somewhat determined by use of a
'eals-o,ase,a allocation system in the states. The coefficient demonimprovement over the 1962 model and reflects the wider use
neE~ds'-balsed allocation systems by the mid-1970s. Although not sigpredictors, both state tax capacity and functional comprehendisplayed somewhat surprising relationships to revenue sharContrary to the expectations, residual revenue sharing was larger
cities that carried a heavier municipal burden for local education
welfare services and whose states had smaller tax capacity.

1;'¥2.'it ---

,

184

Intergovernmental Relations and Public Policy
State-aty Revenue Sharing Policy

Table 12.2 Multiple Regression Models for Residual State-City Revenue
Sharing and State System Measures, 1962-1982
Predictou

Coefficient

Distribution Syac ••
Beta

c-ratio
State Tax Capacity
Beta

t-ratio '

1976

1982,

. 133
. 040
. 215

.681
.288
2.09-

1.240
. 517
4.41-

-.001
-.165
-1.02

- . 024
- . 212
-1.54

- . 001
- . 2l0
-1. 79

.124

-.260
-.365
-3 . 12-

B.ta
t-ratio

.111
. 627

.277
. 250
1.84

a

.910

2.16

.900

!2

. 24
.06

.49

1

.72

.24
4.35-

.66
.43
10.57-

(N)

(42)

(47)

(47)

Functional eQUIp

(Intercept)

1962

lated with revenue sharing in e ch f
measure of de enden'
a o. the three years and is a good
to income and povercy ~he populati?n due to its strong relationship
budget deficit. It appe~s to ~ second dClty need var~able to be used is
and it was highly correlated ~~£o~o measure of ~scal need in cities,
home ownership was not included' me ~wnership .. For th!s reason
w~ largely be represented by deficit~n~e /:al an?lysls, but Its effects
mIt property tax exemptions for elder1 ). e er1y (smce most states perTable 12.3 shows the final
lti I Y
.
bination ,of city need and t mu p e regr~sslOn models using the comagain that for 1962. The ~~te :rst~~ vanables: The weakest model is
negatively related to residual ~ve~l~~nt. pre~ct~r, ~udget deficit, is
anng-mdlcatmg that the revenue was not well targeted in th t
a ye~. So as expected, state residual
revenue sharing was not ve
crisis period. The changes l!:~~~s~ve1~ need during this preurban
F m 76 generally. suggest better
targeting on the part of the st t
positive relationship between ~ue;g'etO~ e£~~tpled' there IS the ~xpected
e ICl an revenue shanng and,

*p < .05.

The 1982 analysis suggests the best model for residual revenue
ing. By that year, two of the predictors-the distribution system
functional comprehensiveness-were significant. As
larger revenue sharing receipts in the sample cities were found
cities had fewer functional responsibilities and the state used a
based distribution system. Again, state tax capacity was negatively
,
ed to revenue sharing. This three-variable model explains 43
the variation in the cities' residual revenue sharing receipts, better '
either 1962 or 1976. The final time-point analysis also suggests a
about in this form of aid. No longer was more revenue sharing
cities that had more education and welfare services supported
municipal treasury. As expected, this may indicate that states
revenue sharing to cities already receiving more total state aid
of the categorical assistance for these functions.) Finally, the
the 21-year period is a positive one, with states making
changes in the revenue sharing distribution system that
stronger relationship with city need,.
,
The final stage in the analysis is to examine the effects of both
need and state system variables on residual revenue sharing.
parsimonious set of predictors, including just two city need
were chosen for this stage in the analysis. One is a mf"astJTe
cioeconoriric need in cities--elderly. This variable was oo:sitivelv.
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Final Multiple. RegreSSion Models for Residual State-City
Revenue Sharrng, 1962-1982
Predictor.

Coefficient:

1962

1976

1982

-.000
-.325
-2 . 09-

.000
. 256
1.83

-.000
-.054
-.475

. 122
. 122
. 751

. 401
. 427
3 . 25_

. 384
.383
3.03-

t-ratio

.373
.112
. 608

. 000
. 256
1.83

. 995
.415,
3.74-

Beta
t-ratio

- . 001
-.152
- . 952

-.001
-.080
-.624

- .000
- . 072
- . 633

. 056
. 053
. 284

.080
.072
. 544

- 2.57'"

. 816

.802

. 260

.68
.47
7.00-

.75
.56
10.06-

(47)

(47)

Budget De~icit
Beta
t-ratio

Elderly B. .. idual
Beta

t-ratio
Distribut i on Sy.te1Zl
Beta

State Tax Capacity

Functional Comp

b
Beta

t-ratio
(Intercept)

:2
P
(N)

-p

i

.05.

. 41
.17
1.42
(42)

- . 200
- . 283

"

.',Wet 186

Intergovernmental Relations and Public Policy
State-City Revenue Sharing Policy

also, elderly and revenue sharing. Along with the positive effects ~f the
distribution formula, there is clear evidence that states were do~g a
much better job of responding to city need by that year. Th~ predictors
representing city need are obviously more important ~etennIn~nts than
the state system variables in this year; together the five predictors. account for 47 percent of the variability in 1976 residual revenue shanng. .
The importance of the state system variables is much more apparent
in the final model, that for 1982. Although elderly was sill! a . str~ng .
predictor, the strongest detenninant in that ye~r was th.e distribution
formula. Again in this year we can note that hi.g~er r~sldual revenue
sharing monies were found among sample aties With greater socioeconomic need, fewer education and welfare burdens on the
.•.
pal budget, and where states emphasized city n~ed in the
system for revenue sharing. Together, these vanabl~s a~count for
percent of the variability in residual revenue shanng In 1
strongest of the three models.
CONCLUSION

Local governments are turning to the states, expecting their
government to pick·up some of the sl~ck left by the federal
meni's reduced role in local problem solVIng. A clear colnrrlimneIlt
need will be evident in the allocation of state aid monies to local
ments throughout the remainder. of this decade. On~ of the
tions for state aid, and one that will be most wel~ome m COlnrrlurliti4~S"
more extensive use of state-local revenue sharmg. A strong
can be made that these funds will be more effective if they are
to needier communities. The pattern of targeting that has oc(::tll'Irea
residual revenue sharing for cities from 1962 to 1982 suggests that
have demonstrated that they can respond to urban needs.
For instance, the data for 1962 indicate that state-city ~evenue
was not targeted to needy cities. But the change occur.n ng by
erally supports the hypothesis that state revenue s~~g would
ter targeted following the peak of the urban cnsls and
ing/reapportionment in state gove~ents .. State re~enue ~ .. ,.... ~."'
shown to be responsive to all three dimenSions-sOCIal, ea>n()m:ic/ i
fiscaI--of city need in this period. One could rea~onably
change to such factors as the i~creased stat~ capaaty and willlingtlE
play a more prominent role m urban affa1r5, the example set
federal government through direct federal-local aid progr~s, as
the initial movement toward a more state-centered federahsm
gan during the Nixon administration. More recently, the
1982 reveals that although residual revenue sharing ~oe~ not
be as responsive to need as it was in 1976, there 15 still
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targeting in the 1980s. Yet it seems plausible that states did not actually
alter t?eir me~hod of !~ge~g b:!ween 1976 and 1982. Rather, by 1982
changmg socal conditions In aties, such as the growing number of
e~derly and po~r elderly and the increase in reported crime, may have
gtven these soaal need variables more importance than other need factors. At the same time, the revenue sharing aid mechanism may have
become more popular for those large cities that wanted to avoid the
additional "grantsmanship" often needed to secure categorical funds.
And more states had included local need as a factor in the revenue
sharing distribution syste,?: The ease of receiving state revenue sharing
funds may have aIlowed abes to rely upon these funds in lieu of seeking
new forms of categorical aid.
In sum, city need is an apparent and important factor in state-city
r:ven~e sha~g~particularly in the mid-1970s. State system explanati?n~ In~rease In ~portance over time such that the revenue sharing
distnbution system IS the most important determinant of residual revenue sharing by the early 1980s. We should note that 1982 was only the
fIrst yea~ that any New Federalism initiatives were in place. The pattern
of targeting obse~ed am?ng sample citie.s in 1982 may be continuing
and perhaps even ImprOVIng as we move mto the middle of the decade
and states become more settled with the latest version of state-centered
federalism. A~ a minimum, the evidence indicating that the state role in
revenue sharmg has been a positive one since the mid-1970s should
provide local government officials with a positive outlook on state responsiveness for the foreseeable future. And, if states continue the
trend toward wider employment of local government need as a criterion
the revenue sharing a!location process, this type of state aid may
the most responsive form of assistance for cities in need.

1. Information was calculated from U.S. Bureau of the Census State GavenlFinances in (year) for 1962, 1976, and 1982, (Washington, D.C.; Government
Office, 1963, 1977, 1983).
More exactly, the list is the 47 largest U.S. cities in 1970 exclusive of WashD.C., which, of course, receives no state aid.
.
for the state revenue sharing variables are taken from Table 7 in U.S.
the Census, City Government Fillances in (year), for 1962, 1975-76, and
(Washington, D.C. ; Government Printing Office, 1963, 1977, 1983).
Data for the social and economic need variables were taken from the 1960,
and 1980 Censuses of Population and Housing.
Data for the fiscal need variables were taken from the 1960, 1970, and 1980
of Population, and City Government Finances in (year) for 1962, 1975-76,
1981-82, Table 7.
The basis for distributing revenue sharing is found in U.S. Bureau of the
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Census, Census of Governments, 1962 (and
Governments (Washington, DA~o;;;=:of ;;;te a~d Local Fiscal Capacity and
7. Data were taken from
'.
i
States (1983).
Tax Effort (1962); ~nd 1981 Tax Capa~ty:! t;: F(1~2) .56'(1976), .61 (1982).
8. The correlations are as follows. r .
,
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Incremental and Abrupt
Change in Fiscal Centralization
in the American States, 19571983
Jeffrey M. Stonecash
Change has been a fundamental part of state-local fiscal relations in the
United States. Over the last 30 years states have assumed an increasing
role in fiscal matters. States now raise a larger proportion of all revenue
raised by states and their localities. States also provide a larger proportion of direct services, and local governments are more reliant than ever
on state aid as a source of their revenue (Stonecash, 1983, 1985).
. While change has occurred, how it occurs is not clear. Is it incremental
with
making marginal adjustments that nonetheless produce
SlgrutlCrutlt cumulative change? Lindblom (1959) suggested that most
UUIJLVllldlJ<.JJllo! is characterized by incrementalism. Beer (1973) argued
the specific area of centralization the primary driving force is
change in the structure of the economy. This fits well with the
rV1lITm'nr of Dye (1966) that economic forces are primary in affecting
policies. If broad and gradual changes in society and the economy
important, then our explanatory focus might be on how political
absorb and respond to gradual change.
however, argue that change is just as likely to be abrupt.
reanalysis of Key's (1949) hypothesis about the "organization"
groups supports this view. He found that changes in state
were abrupt and products of different coalitions gaining control
rnv,,'rnrrIPnt (1977, 1979). Wirt (1983:307) and Due (1963:4) argue,
the Ovil War and the Great Depression were sources
IlgJliti.callt changes in fiscal responsibilities of state governments.
(1983:149) finds a clear burst of state tax adoptions during the
From this perspective our theories and methods must be devel-
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